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COMPENSATION OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: 
A REEXAMINATION 
The compensation of the federal judiciary has been a persistent 
issue since the enactment of the judiciary Act of 1789.1 The problem 
has been traditionally perceived in the context of particular proposals 
for salary increases,2 but the underlying issues are much more funda-
mental than the concerns of the day. The instituti.onal arrangements by 
which judicial compensation is determined and the factors which shape 
that determination have a profound impact on the fiscal and human 
resouces of the judiciary, on the power relationships among the three 
branches of the national government, and, thereby, on the indepen-
dence and quality of the judicial branch. 
Though many analogous problems are shared by state judges, those 
of the federal judiciary are of special concern. Its judges enjoy a 
salient prestige, its courts are distributed geographically throughout 
the country,3 and its relationship with Congress and the Executive 
Branch is unique. While the states differ widely in their approaches 
to judicial compensation,4 these differences no doubt reflect variations 
in local needs and priorities. The federal system itself, on the other 
hand, establishes a dichotomy which sets federal courts and judges 
apart from their state counterparts, implying separate consideration 
of their requirements. 
1 1 Stat. 73 (1789). 
2 See, e.g., JUDICIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL SALARIES, H.R. REP. No. 49, 84th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1955); Hearings on H.R. 113, H.R. 1494, and H.R. 3886 Before Subcomm. No.2 of the 
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 6 (1951); Hearings Before the 
Comm. on Judicial and Congressional Salaries, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); REPORTS OF THE 
TASK FORCES OF THE COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL SALARIES, S. Doc. No. 
97, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); Hearings on S. 5, S. Jl63, S. 1415, and S. 1663 Before a 
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953); American 
Judicature Society, Judicial Salaries and Retirement Plans in the United States, 54 JUDICA-
TURE 180 (1970); Dickerman, The Business of the Federal Courts, and the Salaries of the 
Judges, 24 AM. L. REV. 78 (1890); Issac, The Relief of Federal Courts and the Pay of Federal 
Judges, 93 CENTRAL L.J. 255 (1921); Mitchell, The Judicial Salary Crisis, 39 A.B.A.J. 197 
(1953); Mooney, Federal Judges Compensation-Proposed Legislation, 27 N.Y.U.L. REV. 
457 (1952). 
3 In 1974, there were 667 federal judges located in the fifty states, the District of Colum-
bia, Canal Zone, Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, and Guam. This does not include bankruptcy 
judges and staff, which numbered 1056, or U.S. Magistrates and staff, which numbered 710. 
Civil Filings Up, but Criminal Filings Down in Federal Courts, Administrative Office Report 
Shows, 60 A.B.A.J. 1404, 1407 (1974). 
4 There are differences in amount of annual salary; availability oflocal supplements to the 
annual salary; benefits, including medical and life insurance, holidays, and vacation time; 
expense reimbursement; retirement plans; procedure for salary increases; and constitutional 
provisions concerning minimum and maximum salaries. See American Judicature Society, 
Judicial Compensation 1974, 58 JUDICATURE 159, 168-206 (1974). 
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This analysis, therefore, will first examine and criticize the present 
system of compensation for federal judges. Next, an inquiry will be 
made into the purposes and goals that a compensation scheme for the 
federal judiciary should serve. Finally, a proposal for a new system of 
compensation will be offered, which, it is hoped, is responsive to 
presently perceived needs. 
I. THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL 
COMPENSATION 
The patterns of increases of federal judicial salaries has been 
marked by long, irregular intervals in which salary levels remained 
constant. G A span of less than six years between increases has occurred 
only twice.6 As of the beginning of 1975, the salary of federal judges 
had not changed in six years.7 
5 The history of salaries of Supreme Court Associate Justices (with the Chief Justice 
receiving an additional $500 each year until 1969, and an additional $2500 thereafter) is $3500, 
I Stat. 72 (1789); $4500, 3 Stat. 484 (1819); $6000, 10 Stat. 655 (1855); $8000, 16 Stat. 494 
(1871); $10,000, 18 Stat. 108 (1874); $12,500, 32 Stat. 825 (1903); $14,500, 36 Stat. 1152 (1911); 
$20,000,44 Stat. 919 (1926); $25,000, 60 Stat. 716 (1946); $35,000,69 Stat. 9 (1955); $39,500, 
78 Stat. 434 (1964); and $60,000, 83 Stat. 864 (1969). 
The history of salaries of the judges of the Courts of Appeals since 1891, the year in which 
the Courts of Appeals were established, is $6,000, 16 Stat. 494 (1871), 26 Stat. 826 (1891); 
$7,000,32 Stat. 825 (1903); $8,500, 40 Stat. 1157 (1919); $12,500, 44 Stat. 919 (1926); $17,500, 
60 Stat. 716 (1946); $25,500, 69 Stat. 10 (1955); $33,000, 78 Stat. 434 (1964); and $42,500,83 
Stat. 864 (1969). 
The history of the salaries of the judges of the district courts since 1891, the year in which 
salaries were made uniform for all district judges, is $5,000, 26 Stat. 783 (1891); $6,000, 32 
Stat. 825 (1903); $7,500,40 Stat. 1156 (1919); $ 10,000,44 Stat. 919 (1926); $15,000, 60 Stat. 716 
(1946); $22,500, 69 Stat. 10 (1955); $30,000, 78 Stat. 434 (1964); and $40,000, 83 Stat. 864 
(1969). 
In connection with the changing salaries it is relevant to note the history of the tax status of 
federal judges. In Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920), and Miles v. Graham, 268 U.S. 501 
(1925), it was held that as a matter of constitutional law, based on U.S. Const. art. 3, § I, 
salaries of federal judges were not subject to federal income taxes. This rule was reversed, 
however, in O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277 (1939). In Baker v. Commissioner, 149 
F.2d 342, 344 (4th Cir. 1945), cerro denied, 326 U.S. 746 (1945), it was held that "ajudge who 
takes office under an established Congressional policy of taxing his salary becomes entitled 
only to the salary prescribed by statute less income taxes .... " Moreover, the court 
emphasized that the constitutional provision against diminishing judicial salaries did not 
apply to raising income tax rates. Consequently, since the policy of taxing federal judges' 
salaries was established in the Revenue Act of 1918,40 Stat. 1057 (1919), the only judges to 
whom the doctrine of Evans v. Gore now has any application are those who entered the 
federal judiciary before 1918. See also B. BITTKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE 
AND GlFr TAXATION 180 (4th ed. 1972). 
With respect to state and local taxation offederaljudges' salaries, Congress consented to 
such taxation in the Public Salary Act, 53 Stat. 574 (1939). Congress-may so consent in the 
area of intergovernmental taxation. Graves v. New York ex rei. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 
(1939). 
6 Supreme Court justices waited only three years between 1871 and 1874. All federal 
judges' salaries were increased in 1964 and 1969, a five-year span. 
7 Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, $62,500; Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, 
$60,000; Judges of the Courts of Appeals, $42,500; Judges of the District Courts, $40,000; 
Judges of the Court of Claims, Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, Court of Military 
Appeals, $42,500; Judges of the Customs Court and Tax Court, $40,000.83 Stat. 864 (1969). 
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Federal judges have attractive retirement benefits. After reaching 
seventy years of age and having served at least ten years on the bench, 
a judge may resign and continue to receive the same salary; as he 
received at his date of resignation.s If a judge is age sixty-five with 
fifteen years of service or seventy with ten years of service, he may 
accept retired-judge status and have a reduced workload.9 He may 
then continue to receive the regular salary of that office.10 In case of 
disability while on the bench, a judge may retire and receive the full 
salary of the office if he has served for ten years or longer, or 50 per-
cent of his former salary if he has served less than ten yearsY Judges 
have the additional opportunity to elect to subscribe to an annuity 
plan which pays to the judge's survivors a sum upon his death,12 vary-
ing with his average salary and length of service.13 
The Commission on Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Salaries, 
which is charged with the duty of recommending the level of judicial 
compensation, was established in 1967 Y The Commission, composed 
of nine appointed members,15 is required to make its recommendations 
to the President at four-year intervals.16 The law requires that the 
President, in the budget next submitted by him after receipt of a report 
of the Commission, set forth his recommendations with respect to the 
828 U.S.C. § 371(a) (1970). 
• 28 U.S.C. § 371(b) (1970). 
10 Jd. 
11 28 u.s. c. § 372(a) (1970). 
12 28 U .S.C. §§ 375, 376 (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972). 
13 Length of service includes all governmental service, whether judicial or not. 28 U .S.C. 
§ 376(c) (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972). In addition to the annuities, other fringe 
benefits are available. Judges are covered by government health programs and share the cost 
of the premiums with the government. Vacations may extend to one month; holidays 
generally correspond to those observed in the place where the court sits. Judges are also 
reimbursed for official travel. See American Judicature Society, supra note 4, at 194. 
142 U.S.C. § 351 et seq. (1970). 
15 Appointees include 
(a) three appointed by the President ofthe United States, one of whom shall be 
designated as Chairman by the President; (b) two appointed by the President of 
the Senate; (c) two appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives; 
and (d) two appointed by the Chief Justice of the United States. 
2 U.S.C. § 352(1) (1970). 
16 Jd. § 352(3); 2 U.S.C. § 357 (1970). 
A variety of executive, legislative, and judicial positions are subject to the Commission's 
scrutiny. Included are . 
(A) Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, and the Resident 
Commissioner from Puerto Rico; (B) offices and positions in the legislative 
branch referred to in sections 136a and 136a-1 of this title, sections 42a and 51a 
of Title 31, sections 162a and 162b of Title 40, and section 39a of Title 44; (C) 
justices, judges, and other personnel in the judicial branch referred to in 
sections 402(d) and 403 of the Federal Judicial Salary Act of 1964; (D) offices 
and positions under the Executive Schedule in Subchapter II of Chapter 53 of 
Title 5; and (E) the Governors of the Board of Governors of the United States 
Postal Service appointed under section 202 of Title 39. 
2 U.S.C. § 356 (1970). 
HeinOnline -- 8 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 597 1974-1975
SPRING 1975] Compensation of the Federal Judiciary 597 
levels of compensation.17 The President's recommendations become 
effective thirty days following transmittal of the budget, unless in the 
meantime: 
(A) there has not been enacted into law a statute which estab-
lishes rates of pay other than those proposed by all or part of 
such recommendations, [or] (B) neither House of the Congress 
has enacted legislation which specifically disapproves all or part 
of such recommendations. IS 
II. OBJECTIONS TO THE PRESENT SCHEME 
The present scheme of compensation is objectionable from the 
point of view of judges,19 of the judiciary as a whole,20 and of a society 
interested in diffusion of power within the national government.21 The 
objections chiefly put forth are that the present system results in 
inadequate salaries,22 that salary distribution within the federal 
judiciary is inequitable,23 and that the system encroaches upon the 
independence of the federal judiciary.24 Additionally, judicial re-
sources are inefficiently expended in lobbying efforts.25 The ultimate 
danger is a decline in the quality of the jUdiciary. 
A. Inadequacy of Salaries 
With increasing frequency since the end of World War II, federal 
judges have said that they can not live adequately on their official 
salaries.26 The judges' complaints tend to emphasize that their salaries 
cause uncertainty about their ability to provide adequately for their 
children's education and to accumulate savings for the support of their 
172 U.S.C. § 358 (1970). 
18 2 U.S.C. § 359 (1970). 
19 The expressions of judicial discontent with the present system are plentiful. See, e.g., 
Chapin, The Judicial Vanishing Act, 58 JUDICATURE 160 (1974) (includes interviews with 
former federal judges). 
20 Id.; See also Remarks of Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, in ANNUAL REPORT ON THE 
STATE OF THE JUDICIARY, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION MID-WINTER MEETING, CHICAGO, 
ILLINOIS, Feb. 23, 1975, at 8-9. 
21 Wall Street J., Jan. 31,1975, at 8, col. I. 
22 See notes 26-38 and accompanying text infra. 
23 See notes 39-44 and accompanying text infra. 
24 See notes 45-51 and accompanying text infra. 
25 See note 88 and accompanying text infra. 
26 See Hearings Before the Comm. on Judicial and Congressional Salaries, supra note 2, 
at 63 (statement of Evan Howell, former judge of the Court of Claims); Id. at 241-52 
(statement of Harold M. Kennedy, former United States District Court Judge). See also 
Chapin, sllpra note 19, at 161-62 (statements of former district judges Anthony T. Augelli, 
David L. Middlebrooks, and Arr'Jld Bauman). 
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families after their deaths.27 In view of the fact that the median in-
come of American families in 1972 was $11,116,28 one might question 
a claim that a person can not adequately live on $40,000 per year, the 
present salary of a federal district court judge. There are, however, 
special circumstances involving compensation of a federal judge that 
make such a suggestion plausible. It is inconsistent with proper judicial 
behavior for a judge to make productive use of his official income in 
large scale investments.29 Such a restraint is derived from the assump-
tion, which has not always been followed by individual judges,30 that 
judges should be impartial and independent of extraneous economic 
influence. Today, these restraints on extrajudicial conduct have been 
formalized and forcefully expressed in the Code of Judicial Conduct. 
The most specific canons on the subject are 5C(1): 
A judge should refrain from financial and business dealings that 
tend to reflect adversely on his impartiality, interfere with the 
proper performance of his judicial duties, exploit his judicial 
position, or involve him in frequent transactions with lawyers or 
persons likely to come before the court on which he serves. 
and 5C(3): 
A judge should manage his investments and other financial inter-
ests to minimize the number of cases in which he is disqualified. 
As soon as he can do so without serious financial detriment, he 
should divest himself of investments and other financial interests 
that might require frequent disqualification.31 
27 See, e.g., the statement of Harold M. Kennedy, former llnited States District Judge, at 
the 1953 Senate Hearings on judicial salaries: 
[W]hen I resigned I had nothing to say about the reason for my resignation; I did 
not think it was appropriate. But now maybe is the time to say it. ... I do not 
keep a maid; I never did, and I do not have a car and never did. My household 
expenses ran to about $700 a month. By the time that I got through I had 
absolutely no way of getting any security for my wife; she is younger than I. I 
had no means of paying for an annuity for her. I had some insurance, but I had 
no private capital and no outside income. 
Hearings on S. 5, S. 1163, S. 1415, and S. 1663, supra note 2, at 54-55. 
See also Chapin, supra note 19, at 161-62. 
28 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1974 at 
385 (1974). 
29 ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, CANONS 5, 6. 
30 For a discussion of extreme examples of judges who violated their duties of indepen-
dence and impartiality beyond the point of mere conflict of interest, see J. BORKIN, THE 
CORRUPT JUOOE (1962). Borkin's study concentrates on the judicial misconduct of three 
judges. Other examples include judges who have been impeached and removed from office. 
See Swindler, High Court of Congress: Impeachment Trials, 1797-1936,60 A.B.A.J. 420, 427 
(1974). 
31 The Commentary to Canon 5C is explicit about whether financial security or objectivity 
should take precedence if the two conflict: 
Canon 5 may cause temporary hardship in jurisdictions where judicial 
salaries are inadequate and judges are presently supplementing their income 
HeinOnline -- 8 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 599 1974-1975
SPRING 1975J Compensation of the Federal Judiciary 599 
Furthermore, the adequacy of judicial compensation may reflect the 
fact that most federal judges have the alternative of practicing law at 
a higher salary.32 This problem is not new.33 A contemporary example 
is that of Arnold Bauman, a former judge in the Southern District of 
New York, who left the bench for a $150,OOO-per-year position with 
a. New York law firm.34 From the perspective of a federal judge, a 
judicial salary is likely to represent a significant financial sacrifice. 
In addition, a federal judge may regard his salary as inadequate in 
comparison to salaries of some state judges. In twenty states, some of 
through commercial activities. The remedy, however, is to secure adequate 
judicial salaries. 
Canon 6 emphasizes that public disclosure of compensation should be the rule for judges: "A 
judge should regularly file reports of compensation received for quasi-judicial and extra-
judicial activities." And though judges may hold and manage investments, subject to the 
previous qualifications, Canon 5C(2) states that a judge "[s]hould not serve as an officer, 
director, manager, advisor, or employee of any business." 
32 The survey reported at 60 A.B.A.J. 123 (1974), indicates that the median total compen-
sation of heads of corporate law departments is $57,000. Former Judge David L.. Middle-
brooks of the Northern District of Florida, who resigned August 1, 1974, to enter private 
practice, suggests that people with sufficient competence to be federal judges could earn 
$60,000 to $100,000 a year practicing law. Chapin, supra note 19, at 161. 
33 John Marshall was faced with this financial consideration: 
Marshall's salary as Chief Justice was $500 more than that paid to the other 
Justices. He received $4,000 a year when he was first appointed, and that was 
increased to $5,000 in 1819. This, of course, was far below the potential 
available to him if he had remained a lawyer in private practice and indicates 
why he felt compelled to write the Washington biography and also why he 
speculated so much in land development. 
L. BAKER, JOHN MARSHALL: A LIFE IN LAW 558 (1974). As to the American judiciary in 
general between 1776 and 1847: 
A prominent. lawyer usually took a cut in income if he became a judge. The 
salaries of judges, as of public officials in general, were not generous. Judges 
continually complained that they were pinched for money. By statute in 1827, 
New Jersey fixed the salary of the justices of the state supreme court at $1 ,000. 
The chief justice earned $1,200. The governor earned $2,000. Lemuel Shaw 
became chief justice of Massachusetts in 1830 at a salary of $3 ,000. The salary 
was the source of his only reluctance. For trial judges, the fee system was 
common. A New York law of 1786 awarded fees to the "judge of the court of 
probates, ... to wit: For filing every petition, one shilling; for making and 
entering every order, six shillings; for every citation, under seal, to witnesses, 
or for any other purposes, six shillings ... for copies of all records and 
proceedings, when required, for each sheet consisting of one hundred and 
twenty-eight words, one shilling and six pence." Under the fee system, lower-
court judges sometimes got rich. But higher levels of the bench paid off in the 
coin of high status. 
L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 121 (1973) (footnotes omitted). 
Another well-known historical figure is Associate Supreme Court Justice Benjamin R. 
Curtis who resigned from the bench in 1857 because he considered his $6,000 per year salary 
to be inadequate. Mr. Justice Curtis then practiced law for seventeen years until his death. 
During that time, he had an average annual income of slightly over $38,000 per year. 
Dickerman, supra note 2, at 85. 
34 N.Y. Times, June 9,1974, at 5, col. J. Other examples include former Judge Middle-
brooks of the Northern District of Florida, who is now making at least $60,000 a year working 
for a Pensacola law firm. Chapin, supra note 19, at 161-62. Sidney O. Smith, former District 
Judge for the Northern District of Georgia, "would have turned down a $120,000 partnership 
offer if even a 25 percent salary hike had corne through." Time, Feb. 10, 1975, at 74. 
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the state judges are paid as much as or more than federal district 
judges.35 In New York, the most extreme example, judges of the 
Family Court in New York City are paid a greater salary than federal 
district judges.36 This appears to be somewhat anomalous and would be 
especially so to a federal judge37 if the proposition is taken seriously 
that a higher status, responsibility, and popularity inhere in the federal 
bench38 and that such factors warrant a higher salary. On the other 
hand, status may be part of the federal judges' compensation, albeit 
an intangible one. 
B. Inequities 
A second objection to the present federal judicial compensation 
scheme is directed at its inequity. Judges are paid identical salaries for 
assuming roughly equ~l responsibility and doing similar work, but 
they work and live in very different places subject to a wide range of 
living costs. One measure of these costs is the Consumer Price Index 
for various regions of the country. For example, the annual average 
of the Consumer Price Index for 197339 was 145.5 for the Philadelphia 
area and 127.5 for the Seattle area, a difference of 18.0.40 Another 
inequitable aspect of the present uniform system is that the relative 
35 These states include Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, 
Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
New York, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin. American Judica-
ture Society, supra note 4, at 168-93 (1974). 
36 Judges of the Family Court in New York City make $42,451 per year, as dojudges of the 
New York City Civil Court and the New York City Criminal Court. /d. at 183, 184. 
37 See Time, Feb. 10, 1975, at 74. 
38 Judge Friendly has suggested that the reasons for the high status and popularity of the 
lower federal courts 
may be due in part to their rather low visibility .... Yet I think the impression 
is rather general that, with the exceptions inevitable for an institution that has 
endured for so many generations ... , they have largely fulfilled Hamilton's 
expectations that "[j]ustice through them may be administered with ease and 
dispatch" and that, owing their "official existence to the union," they "will 
never be likely to feel any bias inauspicious to the principles on which it is 
founded." 
H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 2-3 (1973) (footnotes omitted). 
39 U.S. DEPT OF LABOR, MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW, Nov. 1974, at 108. 
The Consumer Price Index is a monthly statistical measure of the average 
change in prices of goods and services purchased by urban wage earners and 
clerical workers for day-to-day living. It is based on prices of about 400 
"market-basket" items selected to represent all consumption goods and ser-
vices purchased by these workers. 
Id. at 100. 
Price indexes are given in relation to the base period of 1967= 100. Id. at 100. It is also 
possible to use the "City Worker's Family Budget," published annually by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics of the United States Department of Labor, which covers thirty-nine areas in 
the United States and compares the budgets of three groups offamilies according to the level 
of their expenditure. Cost-of-living figures compiled by the states are also available. 
40 The areas listed include not only the central city but the entire urban portion of the 
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas, as defined for the 1960 Census of Population. /d. at 
108. 
HeinOnline -- 8 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 601 1974-1975
SPRING 1975] Compensation of the Federal Judiciary 601 
status of federal judges may vary according to their locality. This 
phenomenon results from the fact that in some states federal judge-
ships are financially more attractive than a comparable position with 
the state judiciary, while in other states, the opposite is true. The 
extremes of the state salary differential are in the states of New York 
and Utah: the average salary of a New York state judge is roughly 
2.63 percent greater than that of his counterpart in UtahY Depending 
on the position within this wide range, the federal judiciary is either a 
more or less attractive alternative to state judicial service. 
Moreover, the Commission on Executive, Legislative, and Judicial 
Salaries works to the disadvantage of the federal judges and the federal 
judiciary. Of all the positions subject to the Commission's jurisdiction, 
the federal judges are the only group so widely distributed throughout 
the country.42 Thus, salary needs of the judges differ from the needs of 
Congressmen and certain executive personnel. Yet, because the Com-
mission must always review together the salaries of the five statutory 
groups under its jurisdiction,43 including "the relationships between 
and among the respective offices and positions covered by such re-
view,"44 salary increases for judges tend to be considered only in 
conjunction with those for the other groups. 
c. Encroachment on Judicial Independence 
Because the establishment of judges' salaries is a product of the 
interrelation of a public commission, the President, and the Congress, 
the judiciary is vulnerable to institutional conflict. Such conflict can 
threaten its independence vis-a.-vis the other branches. This develop-
ment is unfortunate because the concept of judicial independence, 
though difficult to define, goes to the very heart of the American sys-
tem of government. It is a common assumption that independence is 
a necessary condition for an effective judiciary.45 An illustration of the 
effect of the present method of salary determination will demonstrate 
its detrimental impact on judicial independence. 
The law establishing the Commission on Executive, Legislative, and 
Judicial Salaries was approved on December 16, 1967.46 The Com-
41 American Judicature Society, supra- note 4, at 183, 190. 
42 Except for some of the positions under level IV, 5 V.S.C.A. § 5315 (1967), as amended 
(Supp. 1975), and level V, 5 V.S.C.A. § 5316 (1967), as amended (Supp. 1975), most of the 
offices subject to the Commission's jurisdiction are centered in the Washington, D.C., area. 
See note 16 supra. 
43 2 V.S.c. § 356 (1970). 
442 V.S.c. § 356(i) (1970). 
45 D. MINAR, IDEAS AND POLITICS: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 128 (1964). 
46 81 Stat. 642 (1967). 
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mission's first report was not submitted to the President until 
December, 1968, and the President submitted his recommendations 
to the Congress on January 15, 1969.41 Since the Commission is 
required to make its recommendations at four-year intervals,48 the 
next Commission should have formulated its proposals in 1972 and 
made its recommendations to the President in December of that year.49 
However, President Nixon failed to appoint the Commission on time.50 
The recommendations were finally offered in 1974,' an election year 
for Congress but not for the President. Accordingly, Congress rejected 
the proposals for a three-step pay increase.51 The losers of this political 
battle were the federal judges, who received little attention and no 
salary raise. 
D. Decline in Quality of the Federal Judiciary 
It has been frequently suggested that there has been and will be 
difficulty in attracting qualified people to the federal bench.52 Inade-
quate and inequitable salaries may induce judges to leave the Bench 
and discourage qualified candidates from seeking judgeships. To the 
extent that the Judiciary responds by becoming less independent and 
attempting to court either the Congress or the Executive, its status 
may decline. 53 Of more serious consequence, its objectivity in the face 
47 83 Stat. 863 (1969). 
48 2 U.S,C. §§ 352(3), 357 (1970), 
49 2 U.s.c.,§ 352(2) (1970) seems to have contemplated that the first Commission was to be 
appointed in the 1969 fiscal year and was to make its rec"mmendations in time for the 
January, 1969 budget. The next Commission was to have been appointed in the "fourth fiscal 
year following the 1969 fiscal year." Id. § 352(3). That would have meant the 1973 fiscal year 
in order for the recommendations to be available in time for the January 1973 budget. 
President Nixon did not appoint the Commission until the 1974 fiscal year, and his recom-
mendations to the Congress were made in January, 1974. 
50 Senator Gale McGee, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Post Office and Civil 
Service, which initially receives the President's salary recommendations, has also stated, 
President Nixon appointed his quadrennial commission too late for it to 
include a review and to formulate a report to the president so that the question 
could be taken up in 1973, a non-election year, as intended. 
McGee, Are Judicial Salary Increases Coming? 60 A.B.A.J. 1259 (1974). 
51 McGee, supra note 50, at 1259. 
52 See Mooney, supra note 2, at 457. REPORTSOFTHE TASK FORCEOFTHE COMMISSION ON 
JUDICIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL SALARIES, supra note 2, at 56; N. Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1973, at 
46, col. 4 (letter from Prof. Maurice Rosenberg). Chief Justice Burger has recentiy said that 
[the federal jUdiciary has] had more resignations in the past year, based on 
economic grounds, than at any time in the past one hundred years. I am also 
reliably informed that many qualified lawyers have declined appointment be-
cause the pay of a district judge is now only double the starting salary of law 
graduates hired by large law offices. It is surely not in the public interest to have 
some 'of the best qualified lawyers resigning or declining appointments because 
of inequitable and inadequate compensation. 
McGee, supra note 50, at 1260. 
53 It has usually been thought that the threat to status of federal judges comes from the 
increasing number of federal judges and the broadening scope of their duties. H. FRIENDLY, 
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of issues of political import may also be impaired.54 Some indirect 
evidence indicates that the first of these results is already occurring. 
Since the end of World War II, a number of respected federal judges 
have resigned; within the last year alone, seven federal judges have 
resigned, at least five of whom did so partly for salary reasons.55 
III. REFORM IN JUDICIAL COMPENSATION METHODS 
A. The Historical Role of Compensation 
Suggestions for reform of the present system invite an examination 
of historical principles. A starting point is the debate at the Constitu-
tional Convention on the judicial compensation provision of the 
Constitution. 56 The debate centered on the relative merits of the pro-
vision finally adopted, "The Judges ... shall, at stated Times, receive 
for their Services a Compensation which shall not be diminshed during 
their Continuance in Office,"57 and a proposal that "[n]o increase, or 
supra note 38, at 2-3; Carrington, Book Review, 72 MICH. L. REV. 628, 630 (1974). A 
dependent and conformist judiciary would also find its status diminished. 
54 With respect to the major first amendment issues, 
the courts must playa crucial part in maintaining and extending our system of 
freedom of expression. Their competence to do so rests upon their indepen-
dence from the other branches of government, their relative immunity to 
immediate political and popular pressures, the training and quality of their 
personnel, their utilization of legal procedures, and their powers of judicial 
review. The need of the courts to perform this function has become more 
imperative as the nation has moved from nineteenth-century economic 
liberalism to twentieth-century mass democracy. 
T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 13 (1970). 
55 Between 1940 and 1954 eighteen federal judge s resigned. HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMM. 
ON JUDICIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL SALARIES, supra note 2, at 451. Within the last year alone 
the following federal judges resigned: Judge Thomas A. Masterson of Philadelphia; Judge 
Sidney O. Smith of Atlanta; Judge David L. Middlebrooks of Tallahassee; Judge Arnold 
Bauman of New York City; Judge Anthony J. Travia of Brooklyn; Judge Hiram Cancio of 
San Juan; and Judge Anthony T. Augelli of Newark. Letter from Joseph F. Spaniol, 
Executive Assistant to the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 
to the author, October 21, 1974 (on file at the University of Michigan Journa/ of Law Reform); 
Chapin, supra note 19, at 16i; Time, Feb. 10, 1975, at 74. 
5. U.S. CONST. art. III, § I. 
57 Id. Litigation giving meaning to art. III § I has been sparse. The basic questions 
presented by this provision have concerned which judges are protected by the provision and 
whether income taxes "diminish" ajudge's salary. In Charles v. United States, 21 F. Supp. 
366 (Ct. Cl. 1937), it was held that the provision only applies to judges of a constitutional 
court. In that case, it was decided that the income of a referee in bankruptcy arising out of 
fees paid to him for services in that capacity is subject to an income tax, since a referee is not a 
"judge" whose compensation may not be diminished. In O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 
U.S. 516 (1933), it was held that the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals of the District of 
Columbia were constitutional courts, the judges of which could not have their salary con-
stitutionally diminished. 
In Booth v. United States, 291 U.S. 339 (1934), the Supreme Court held that this provision 
prohibits reduction of compensation of retired federal judges below the amount fixed at date 
of retirement, even if the reduced compensation exceeds the judge's salary when he first took 
office. 
The status of the income tax under this provision has already been discussed in note 5 
supra. 
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diminution shall be made so as to affect the persons actually in office 
at the time of such increase or diminution."58 James Madison, a sup-
porter of the latter proposal, argued that the compensation provision 
must not undermine the basic goals of the judicial branch. 59 The pro-
posal, he asserted, would ensure: (1) the impartiality of judges and 
the ability of the judges to carry out their duties objectively; (2) the 
independence of iudges individually. and the judiciary, generally; and 
(3) the quality of the federal judiciary and its ability to attract qualified 
people.60 
The supporters61 of the provision eventually adopted did not dis-
agree with Madison's view of the goals of the judicial branch or the 
role of compensation in furthering these goals. They simply felt that 
allowing legislative increases of judicial salary "would not create any 
improper dependence in the Judges."62 
[They] urged that, as money became more plentiful, manners and 
style of living altered, the country more populous, and the busi-
ness of the Courts increasing, [the judges'] salaries ought to be 
susceptible of increase.63 
Similar views about the role of compensation schemes were ex-
pressed by Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist Papers. He 
emphasized the connection between compensation and the goal of 
independence for judges and the judiciary: 
Next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the 
independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their sup-
port. . . . And we can never hope to see realized in practice the 
complete separation of the judicial from the legislative power, 
in any system which leaves the former dependent for pecuniary 
resources on the occasional grants .of the latter. 64 
Hamilton felt that because of inflation, a fixed-sum approach -would 
58 C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 533 (1937). 
59Id. 
6°Id. 
61 The supporters of what is now art. III, § I, included Gouverneur Morris and Benjamin 
Franklin. Id. 
62Id. 
63 Id. Hart and Wechsler write: 
What chiefly stirred debate was the proposal to prevent the temptation of 
increases. Mter first being accepted in the Committee of the Whole, it was 
rejected in the general debate in the Convention and again in the debate on the 
report of the Committee of Detail. But the rejection was largely on the practical 
ground that the cost of living might rise, and it prevailed only over the strong 
\ opposition of Madison and the votes of Virginia and North Carolina. 
H. HART & H. WESCHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 7(2d ed. 1973) 
(footnotes omitted). See also I M. FARRAND, THE RECORDSOFTHE FEDERAL CONVENTION 121 
(191 I) and 2 id. 44-45, 429-30. 
64 THE FED~RALIST No. 79, at 472 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton). 
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not be adequate and that the legislature would have to be relied on to 
authorize increases. However, to minimize the possible encroachment 
on the judiciary by the legislature, the constitutional provision pro-
hibiting decreases in salary for sitting federal judges was necessary.65 
As chairman of the Massachusetts Judicial Salary Committee in 
1806,66 Joseph Story addressed himself to the role of judicial com-
pensation schemes: 
Domestic ~oncems, and, much more, the active pursuit of prop-
erty, are, in a great degree, inconsistent with [judges'] duties; and, 
as they are thus shut out from the acquisition of wealth, it would 
seem to be the proper office of the legislature to become the 
guardians of their families .... 67 
An acceptable scheme of compensation, he noted, must guarantee 
impartiality and the appearance of impartiality among judges, attract 
qualified people, further the independence of judges, and support the 
"permanent respectability of the judiciary."68 
Modern commentators have not added significantly to these early 
analyses. 69 Recent writing on the subject has come during periods of 
agitation for salary increases.7o The commentators include groups such 
as the American Bar Association71 and the American Judicature 
Society,72 which have been involved in some organized lobbying for 
salary increases. These modern views echo the concern that judicial 
compensation can affect the independence and the quality of the 
judiciary.73 Yet, the goals of compensation schemes and the schemes 
themselves must be brought up to date to reflect the realities of Amer-
ican society in the last quarter of the twentieth century. 
65 [d. at 473. U.S. CONSf. art. III, § l. 
66 Story was head of a committee created by the Massachusetts House of Representatives 
to determine if the salaries of the judges of the Supreme Judicial Court should be increased. 
The committee recommended doubling the salary of the judges. J. STORY, THE MISCEL· 
LANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 58, 61 (W. Story ed. 1852). 
67 [d. at 6l. 
68 [d. at 60. 
69 Much of the discussion on this subject may be found in the Congressional hearings and 
bar journals. See the references cited in note 2 supra. 
70 See, e'!i" Dickerman, supra note 2; Isaac, supra note 2; Mooney, supra note 2; 
Mitchell, supra note 2; American Judicature Society, supra note 2. 
71 The ABA has a standing Committee on Selection, Tenure, and Compensation, which 
has actively lobbied for judicial salary increases. 
72 For over twenty-five years, the American Judicature Society has devoted at least part of 
one issue annually to the subject of judicial compensation. 
73 For example: 
[The] most compelling reason for granting these federal judicial salaries in-
creases ... is the long and widely recognized need for such increases, in order 
to preserve the standing and capacity of this important co-ordinate branch of 
the federal government. 
Mitchell, supra note 2, at 200. 
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B. Institutional Independence and Compensation 
The basic concept that must be re-examined is judicial indepen-
dence. The primary meaning attached to "judicial independence" has 
been the independence of judges to make decisions free of improper 
external pressures. 74 This meaning of judicial independence was im-
plicit in Madison's argument for judicial salaries fixed independently 
of the Congress: 
Whenever an increase is wished by the Judges or may be in agi-
tation in the Legislature, an undue complaisance in the former 
may be felt towards the latter. If, at such a crisis, there should 
be in Court suits to which leading members of the Legislature 
may be parties, the Judges will be in a situation which ought not 
to be suffered if it can be prevented.7r. 
Perhaps the best description of this individualized sense of judicial 
independence was given by Chief Justice John Marshall: 
The Judicial Department comes home in its effects to every man's 
fireside; it passes on his property, his reputation, his life, his all. 
Is it not, to the last degree important, that [the Judge] should be 
rendered perfectly and completely independent, with nothing 
to influence or control him but God and his conscience? ... I 
have always thought . . . that the greatest scourge an angry 
Heaven ever inflicted upon an ungrateful and a sinning people, 
was an ignorant, a corrupt, or a dependent Judiciary.7G 
The focus, then, has historically been on the independence of indi-
vidual judges to render decisions rather than on the independence of 
the judiciary as an entity. As long as adequate provision was made to 
protect the integrity of each judge from financial temptation, the 
judiciary seemed secure.77 It has been suggested that this individualized 
concept of judicial independence is still dominant among federal 
judges today.7R But the vitality of this type of judicial independence is 
74 P. FISH. THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 427 (1973). 
75 C. WARREN, supra note 58, at 533. 
76 Speech by Chief Justice John Marshall during the debates of the Virginia State Conven-
tion of 1829-1830, quoted in O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 532 (1932). 
77 In O'Donoghue the Court said: 
In framing the Constitution, therefore, the power to diminish the compensation 
of the federal judges was explicitly denied, in order, inter alia, that their 
judgment or action might never be swayed in the slightest degree by the 
temptation to cultivate the favor or avoid the displeasure of that department 
which, as master of the purse, would otherwise hold the power to reduce their 
means of support. 
289 U.S. at 531. 
7' P. FISH, supra note 74, at 427. See also Hearings on the Independence ufFederalludges 
Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91 st Cong., 2d Sess, (1970), 
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dependent upon the degree of institutional judicial independence. 79 
The institutional sense of judicial independence is concerned with the 
judiciary as a national institution in its relationship with other national 
institutions.80 Professor Peter G. Fish has argued that the independence 
of the judiciary as an institution may be secured only by the effective 
functioning of a centralized judicial administrative apparatus: 81 
Centralized judicial administration surely poses dangers, but it 
raises a dilemma as well. Without at least some degree of central 
control and clearance, the viability of the judiciary as an inde-
pendent branch may be threatened by local and individual cus-
toms and behavior .... 
Administrative institutions and politics are, after all, but 
means to an end; they are generally not ends in themselves. They 
give life to the separation of powers doctrine in that the judge-
developed administrative system enables courts to adjust to 
changes in their legal, political, and economic environment 
without surrendering judicial independence.82 
In short, the Judiciary must be organized in such a way to be able 
to deal effectively with challenges thrown its way by the Executive 
and Legislative branches as well as local pressures. If the centralized 
judicial administration functions effectively, individual judges may 
function in an environment relatively free from external pressures. 
The federal judiciary has attempted to accomplish an effective cen-
tralization of administration through organizations such as the Judicial 
Conference83 (the national policy making organ), the Administrative 
Office of the Courts84 (the judicial bureaucracy), and the Federal 
Judicial Center85 (the research-and-development organ). These groups 
deal with congressional committees and with the federal bureaucracy 
in an attempt to allow the judiciary "to function as a coordinate 
part of the national political system."86 
But the Judiciary can not assure its independence merely by inter-
posing an administrative institutional framework to deal with cor-
responding institutions in the Legislative and Executive branches. 
Despite administrative centralization, Madison's view that any legis-
lative involvement in judicial compensation schemes would inevitably 
79 P. FISH, supra note 74, at 434; Address by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., The 
Continuing Education of the Judiciary in Improved Procedures, Tenth Circuit Judicial 
Conference, July 5, 1960, at 8. 
80 P. FISH, supra note 74, at 436. 
811d. 
82 Id. at 436-37. 
83 Id. at 228-68. 
84 Id . . at 166-227. 
85 Id. at 340-78. 
861d. at 437. 
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allow the legislature to encroach upon the judiciary remains relevant.87 
The judiciary, through its major administrative organizations, must 
expend time, money, and effort convincing the other branches of the 
necessity of salary increases.88 · Through these organizations, the 
judiciary will inevitably attempt to impress individuals, committees, or 
organizations in Congress or the Executive Branch. In the long run, 
this process may increase the dependence of these organizations on the 
other branches of government, thereby compromising, in tum, the 
independence of the judiciary.89 
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM 
A reform of the present system would provide for automatic annual 
salary increases based on percentage increases in the cost of living90 in 
the ·geographic area where the judge holds court. 91 Before the automatic 
87 See notes 59-61 and accompanying text supra. 
88 Fish has described the Judicial Conference's staff work, which includes preparing 
memoranda in support of bills proposed by the Conference: 
"We put in one eighteen-hour stretch," related Judge Stephens, "myself, 
Biggs, three secretaries, and a law clerk, from 9:30 in the morning until12:30at 
night, to get the statutes and memorandum drafted in time for a deadline for 
their presentation to Senator McCarran [chairman of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee] and Congressman Cellar [chairman of the House Judiciary Com-
mittee]. " 
Some memoranda were exhaustively detailed. One to accompany ajudicial 
salary bill considered "the nature and importance of the work of the Federal 
bench, the history of Federal judicial salaries, a comparison of such salaries 
with those of other court systems, including the English, ... the relation of the 
cost of living to salaries and of taxation on a reduction of salaries." 
P. FISH, supra note 74, at 318. See also id. at 322-23, 334-37. 
89 What occurs is a commingling of elites representing separate governmental institutions. 
What results is a pool of interests independent of those institutions.· 
When the individual has become associated with a cooperative enterprise 
[organization] he has accepted a position of contact with others similarly 
associated. From this contact there must arise interactions between these 
persons individually, and these interactions are social. ... They ... cannot 
be avoided . ... Such interactions are consequences of cooperation, and con-
stitute one set of social factors involved in cooperation. These factors operate 
on the individuals affected; and, in conjunction with other factors, become 
incorporated in their mental and emotional characters. 
C. BARNARD, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE 40-41 (1938), quoted in D. HAMPTON, C. 
SUMMER & R. WEBBER, ORGANIZATION BEHAVIOR AND THE PRACTICE OF MANAGEMENT 19 
(1968). When these contacts take place between individuals who represent different organi-
zations there is the possibility that as a result of these interactions 
organizational members and groups may [become] primarily interested in the 
rational pursuit of their narrow interests and the consolidation and improve-
ment of their own power position, even at the expense of wider organizational 
interests. 
N. MOUZELIS, ORGANIZATION AND BUREAUCRACY 159 (1967). This process has also been 
described as "control among leaders" or "political bargaining." R. DAHL & C. LINDBLOM, 
POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND WELFARE 324-65 (1953). 
90 The U.S. Consumer Price Index is one measure of the cost of living that may be used. 
Other possible alternatives are described in note 39 supra. 
91 One method for determining the "area" where ajudge holds court is to use the federal 
judicial districts as the basic area unit. Judges of all the federal courts would be deemed to live 
in the district which contains the court at which they sit most often. 
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increases could be applied, salaries should be readjusted to reflect the 
differences in the cost of living between judicial districts. A base salary 
would be selected for the district with the lowest cost of living. The 
initial salaries for the other districts would be greater than the base 
salary by the percentage that the cost of living in those districts exceeds 
that of the least expensive district. 92 Then, in sub~equent years, the 
automatic increases would be effected. If the cost of living were to 
decrease, there might be constitutional obstacles, derived from the 
prohibition against diminishing the salaries of existing federal judges,93 
to decreasing judicial salaries. To avoid these constitutional problems, 
there should be no actual decreases in salaries, but the percentage 
decreases in the cost of living should be set off against subsequent 
mcreases. 
This proposal has been modeled after a number of contemporary 
examples. At least four states have recently enacted automatic cost-of-
living salary provisions for their judiciary, based either on per capita 
income or on the Consumer Price Index-California,94 Maryland,95 
Massachusetts,96 and Tennessee.97 The experiences of these states with 
92 Forexample, if the Eastern District of Michigan had the lowest cost ofliving, the federal 
district judges sitting in the Eastern District would receive the base salary of, for example, 
$40,000, the present salary offederal district judges. Ifthere are any Courts of Appealsjudges 
who sit most of the time in the Eastern District, they would receive a base salary of$42,500, 
the present salary of judges of the Courts of Appeals. If the cost of living in the Southern 
District of New York is 10 percent higher than that of the Eastern District of Michigan, the 
district judges of the Southern District would receive $40,000 plus 10 percent of $40,000, or 
$44,000. 
93 U.S. CONST. art. III, § I. 
94 CAL. GOV·T. CODE ANN. § 68203 (Supp. 1974). The law provides for an annual automatic 
increase based on the percentage increase in the California consumer price index as compiled 
and reported by the California Department ofIndustrial Relations. The statute had originally 
provided for an automatic increase every fourth year, based on the percentage increase in per 
capita personal income in California as compiled by the U.S. Department of Commerce. Ch. 
144, § 4, [1964] Cal. Stats., 1st Ex. Sess. 
95 MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 47(a) , art. 64A, § 27 et seq. (I 972}. The Maryland system does 
not provide much in the way of a new model for the Federal government. The Secretary of 
Personnel prepares and recommends to the Governor a salary plan, which is subject to the 
Governor's approval and the Legislature's provision of funds. ld. art. 64A, § 27(a). The 
Secretary of Personnel has authority to make provisions for automatic increases. ld. art. 
64A, § 30(a). 
96 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30, § 46 (1973). The Massachusetts system also stops short 
of the automatic increase. Whenever there is a 3 percent increase in the average cost ofliving, 
the director of personnel and standardization must recommend legislation for a correspond-
ing increase in the judge's salaries. The statute does not specify whether the average cost of 
living is the average for the United States or for Massachusetts; the latter would seem to 
make more economic sense. Apparently, the director may suggest legislation where there is 
an increase ofless than 3 percent, though he is not required to do so. He may also recommend 
decreases if the average cost of living decreases, but no salary may be decreased below the 
level of salary in effect on December 31, 1969. 
97 3 TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-2303 (Supp. 1974). The Tennessee statute provides for automa-
tic annual increases based on the percent increase in the average consumer price index (all 
items---city average) as published by the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, between the two calendar years preceding July of the year in which the adjust-
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the problems of accurate cost-of-living indexes and of decreases in the 
cost of living should be useful sources of feedback for drafters of a 
federal proposal. Kentucky has responded to the same economic con-
cerns through judicial action. In a series of decisions beginning with 
Matthews v. Allen,98 the Kentucky courts have interpreted constitu-
tional provisions setting maximum salaries for judges99 as incorporat-
ing changes in the purchasing power of the dollar; accordingly, they 
have held that the constitutional limitations on the maximum level to 
which judicial salaries may be increased are subject to variations in 
the cost of living.loo 
The "post-adjustment" compensation system used by the United 
Nations and World Bank,101 who have staff members working in over 
160 countries and territories,l°2 provides an even more detailed model. 
The purpose of designing the post-adjustment system was to establish 
salary scales "adequate to recruit and retain staff"lo3 and "to 
ensure that salaries have the same purchasing power in- the various 
areas of assignment."lo4 The salaries are computed by taking into 
account: (1) the difference in cost of living between a base city (New 
York) at a base date and the city where the staff member works;lo5 (2) 
ment is made. Apparently, the relevant price index is the average for the entire United States, 
not just for Tennessee. No reduction is made if the average consumer price index should 
decrease. Tennessee's original statute had provided for annual increases based on the 
percentage increase in the per capita personal income in the state between 1970 and the year 
next preceding September 1 of the year for which the salaries are to be paid. Ch. 226, § 1 
[1971] Tenn. Acts 631. 
98 360 S.W.2d 135 (Ky. Ct. App. 1962). 
99 Ky. CONST. § 246 . 
. 100 The Court in Matthews was confronted with a section of the state constitution which 
provided a maximum salary limit for certain public officials. Ky. CONST. § 246. Another 
section of the constitution provided that judges of the circuit courts should receive "adequate 
compensation." Ky. CONST. § 133. Therefore, the court reasoned, to make these provisions 
consistent, the fixed salary limit must be interpreted to take into account the declining 
purchasing power of the dollar, thereby incorporating an automatic cost of living increase 
into the limit. See also Commonwealth v. Hesch, 395 S.W.2d362(Ky. Ct. App. 1965); Meade 
County v. Neafus, 395 S. W.2d 573 (Ky. Ct. App. 1965). In Meade County the court held that 
the Matthews decision did not mean that salaries of public officials would be automatically 
increased as the cost of living increased; Matthews merely gave the legislature authority to 
raise the statutory maximum salary in accordance with the cost ofliving. 395 S. W.2d at 574. 
In this connection, it has recently been suggested that, in violation of U.S. CONST. art. III, 
§ I, judges' salaries are ix:ing diminished by a failure to increase them as the cost of living 
rises. See Time, Feb. 10, 1975, at 74. 
101 The World Bank uses the United Nations post-adjustment salary system. Letter from 
Fredrick Nossal, Information and Public Affairs of the World Bank, to the author, Oct. 18, 
1974 (on file at the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). 
102 Letter from Mohamed H. Gherab, Assistant Secretary-General, Personnel Services, 
United Nations, to the author, Nov. 8, 1974 (on file at the University of Michigan Journal of 
Law Reform). 
103 3 REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR THE REVIEWOFTHE UNITED NATIONS SALARY 
SYSTEM, Supp. No. 28 at 155, U.N. Doc. Al8728 (1972). 
104Id. at 185. 
105 !d. at 163. 178-79. 
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where the primary dependents of the staff member live;lo6 and (3) 
devaluation, revaluation, and the floating of currencies. lo7 Though the 
federal judiciary is not faced with the problems of fluctuating curren-
cies, the practice of taking into account one's primary dependents is 
an aspect of the post-adjustment scheme that may be profitably applied 
to the federal judicial salary system. 
A. The Benefits of the Proposal 
This proposal represents a modest attempt to solve the recurrent 
problems of the inadequacy and inequity of judicial salaries. It more 
clearly tends to promote the goal of independence of the judicial 
branch. By combining these objectives, it seeks to maintain the quality 
of the federal jUdiciary. 
Automatic increases without congressional approval or without 
recommendations of a public commission or of the President would 
make judicial salaries independent of the state of relations between 
Congress and the President. By making the salary issue nonnegotiable, 
representatives of the judiciary would be less vulnerable in their 
dealings with legislative and executive elites and less likely to become 
dependent on them. lOS 
Other aspects of the proposal might maintain or improve the quality 
of the federal judiciary. The fact that salary will increase commen-
surately with increases in cost of living should assure prospective 
judges that any financial sacrifice which appointment to the federal 
bench may entail should not become more severe with the passage of 
time.109 Furthermore, making salary increases automatic would elimi-
nate the necessity for substantial lobbying for higher salariesllo and 
would help assure the impartiality of judges to the extent that their 
political activities are thus minimized. Becaus~ the proposal would 
decrease the amount of time and other resources that judges and judges' 
organizations devote to lobbying, more resources would become avail-
able for other concerns of the judiciary. 
106 [d. at 159, 167-68. 
107 [d. at 190-95. 
108 See note 89 and accompanying text supra. 
109 T. John Lesinski, Chief Judge of the Michigan Court of Appeals, who is planning to 
resign because of inadequate salary, has recently said that if his salary had been subject to 
cost-of-living increases, he would not have decided to resign: . 
If they had kept it at $32,000 with a normal escalator-like the auto workers 
have-to keep up with the rising cost of living, it would have been all right. 
Detroit Free Press, Feb. 20, 1975, at lA, col. 2, and 14A, col. I. 
110 See note 88 and accompanying text supra. 
HeinOnline -- 8 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 612 1974-1975
612 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 8:594 
B. Precedents for the Proposal 
A scheme of nonuniform salaries based in part on regional differ-
ences in the cost of living is hardly novel. From 1789 to 1891, federal 
district judges were paid on a nonuniform basis. In the first judicial 
salary scheme there were thirteen judicial districts and six levels of 
salary, ranging from $800 to $1,800.111 Increases in the salaries of the 
various district judges were enacted sporadically. At anyone time, 
some districts were included in a given enactment and others were 
not.1l2 By 1890, the number of judges and judicial districts had in-
creased to fifty-eight, while the number of levels of salary had decreased 
to four: $5,000, $4,500, $4,000, and $3,500.113 One reason for this 
salary variation was the distance that a judge had to travel.114 In Cali-
fornia for example, the judicial districts were large and the population 
was sparse; federal district judges there had to hold court in several 
places as well as substitute for circuit judges who were able to travel to 
the district only infrequently. Consequently, in 1890, one of the Cali-
fornia district judges was the highest paid judge in the country.115 
In 1891, the change was made to uniform salaries.l16 The uniform 
salary scheme was largely the result of a compromise in the Congress; 
paying all the judges a uniform salary would be less expensive than 
paying them on a nonuniform basis.117 The decision to change was 
not made on the principle that uniform payment was a fairer and 
more equitable systemYs In fact, the opposite was assumed.ll9 
The debate over the Salary Bill120 in 1891 highlights the major 
111 1 Stat. 72 (1789) included the following salary allocation: District of Delaware, $800; 
District of Connecticut, $1,000; District of Kentucky, $1,000; District of Maine, $1,000; 
District of New Hampshire, $1,000; District of New Jersey, $1,000; District of Mas-
sachusetts, $1,200; District of Georgia, $1,500; District of Maryland, $1,500; District of New 
York, $1,500; District of Pennsylvania, $1,600; District of South Carolina, $1,800; District of 
Virginia, $1,800. 
112 See, e.g., 2.Stat. 121 (1801), "An act to augment the salaries of the district judges in 
the districts of Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Delaware and Maryland." 2 Stat. 
431 (1807) gave the judges of the Mississippi, Indiana, Michigan, and Louisiana Territories 
an additional $1,200 each. 2 Stat. 660 (1811) increased only the salary of the judge of the 
Circuit Court of the District of Columbia. 
113 Dickerman, supra note 2, at 86. One judge in California received $5,000. One judge in 
New Orleans received $4,500. Eleven judges in Chicago, Baltimore, Boston, Trenton, New 
York, Brooklyn, Cincinnati, Utica, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and Los Angeles received 
$4,000. Forty-five judges received $3,500. 
114 22 CONGo REC. 3004 (1891) (report of the House judiciary Committee); Dickerman, 
supra note 2, at 86. 
115 Dickerman, supra note 2, at 86 indicates that in 1890 the judge in the District of 
California, Judge Hoffman of San Francisco, was the only one paid $5,000. 
116 26 Stat. 783 (1891). 
11722 CONGo REC. 3004 (1891). 
118 See notes 121-123 and accompanying text infra. 
119 See note 124 and accompanying text infra. 
120 Because the House decided not to consider its own bill, it debated S. 174, 51st Cong., 
1st Sess. (1889), on the House floor. 22 CONGo REC. 3002 (1891). 
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motivations of the Congress in changing the compensation system. 
The original bill called for nonuniform salaries for federal judges 
based explicitly on cost of living variations. 121 This proposal was felt 
to be too expensive and was altered on the House flOOr. 122 Representa-
tive Stewart of Vermont, the sponsor of the bill for nonuniform salaries, 
admitted that 
it has been considered that where any class of Federal officers 
are performing precisely the same service and under equal re-. 
sponsibility" it is unwise to make a discrimination in respect to 
their compensation. As a matter of expediency, inasmuch as this 
has become a crying evil, and everybody recognizes the entire 
inadequacy of the salaries of these officials in many parts of the 
country, and because of the fact ... that all legislation in a coun-
try like ours must of necessity be more or less of a compromise, 
or at least to some extent a compromise, it has been considered 
wiser for Congress, as a measure of affording relief to the judges 
of these courts to fix the salaries on a uniform basis of $5,000.123 
But Mr. Stewart was determined to make known his position that the 
best long-run scheme involved nonuniformity: 
While this salary [$5,000] is ample, no doubt, in some parts of 
the country, in some of. the rural regions where the business of 
the district courts is not large, in others the salary of $5,000 is 
entirely inadequate. Still we believed that it was the best that 
could be done now to fix all on a uniform basis of $5,000.124 
In the twentieth century, uniform salaries for federal judges have 
become the norm. Subsequent Congresses have ignored the political 
expediency leading to the 1891 change and have forgotten the long-
range view of Representative Stewart. For example, a House commit-
tee in 1926, while considering proposals for judicial salary increases, 
included the following comment in its Report: 
It is apparent to every person who has considered this subject of 
salaries and their inadequacy that it is impossible to make and 
pass a bill fixing graduated salaries and paying different compen-
sations to judges of the same class because of geographical or 
121 Representative Stewart remarked: 
The report of the judiciary Committee presents a graded bill, making some 
changes which were thought by the committee to be justified by the difference 
in the expense of living in the different districts. 
22 CONGo REC. 3002 (1891). 
122 The uniform salary bill passed the House on February 21, 1891,22 CONGo REC. 3087 
(1891). 
123 22 CONGo REC. 3004 (1891) (remarks of Representative Stewart) (emphasis added). 
124 22 CONGo REC. 3005 (1891) (remarks of Representative Stewart). 
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other reasons. The mind of the bar association and that of all per-
sons interested in the present bill recognized the fact that a flat 
advance is all that can be accomplished. This is justified because 
today under the law governing the appointment and assignment of 
judges to different localities and districts, judges of our Federal 
courts are like a mobile army that can be moved here and there 
and assigned to work distances probably from their home district. 
All this requires the creation of a flat increase that shall be the 
same in every district throughout the United States. 125 
This argument is not persuasive. If it was possible before 1891 to 
ascertain travel costs and differentiate salaries on that basis, it should 
be possible to differentiate salaries according to the overall cost of 
living, given the available data. 126 
V. CONCLUSION 
Though this proposal for automatic salary increases based on the 
cost of living has some attractive features, it might not be welcomed 
by Congress.127 But if the proposal were to be accepted, a two-step 
process would be necessary to implement it. First, judicial salaries 
would be excluded from the jurisdiction of the Commission on Execu-
tive, Legislative, and Judicial Salaries. Second, a new statute would 
be enacted embodying the proposals set forth in part IV of this article. 
Such an enactment would represent a minor statutory effort to assure 
the independence and quality of the jUdiciary. 
125 H.R. REP. No. 232, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1926). 
126 See note 39 and accompanying text supra. 
-Elliot A. Spoon 
127 One major reason is that Congress has always considered congressional and judicial 
salaries together: 
By some peculiar legislative alchemy, congressional and judicial salaries are 
linked, and when Congress lacks the will to allow itself a pay raise, federal 
judges are among those who must suffer. 
McGee, supra note 50, at 1259. 
